Malware Might Have Played A Part In Deadly Plane Crash

OK, now it's serious.  It's one thing to lose credit card information or for your Facebook account to be high jacked, but malware is said to have been instrumental in the cause of death and destruction in the crash of a Spainair flight two years ago.  Investigators have determined that ground computers were infected with malicious code that may have prevented the pilots from being warned that the flaps were in the wrong configuration for takeoff.

This blog has previously discussed the malicious code problem here, here and here.  Experts in virus protection are becoming increasingly pessimistic about the ability of reactive virus protection to be effective.

A video of the crash can be seen here.  Warning, this is unsettling in that it is video of an event where a large number of people lost their lives.

I told you this was serious.

Virus Protection Using Whitelisting

Last week, we posted an article about some of the ways of protecting a computer or computer network from malicious code.  We discussed primarily methods called "blacklisting" (the more widely used approach) and "whitelisting" (an approach receiving increased attention in recent days).

There is an Austin based company called CoreTrace that features the whitelisting approach.  When we asked, they were kind enough to provide us access to one of their subject matter experts. 

We discussed various aspects of this issue with Greg Valentine, CoreTrace's Director of Technical Sales and Services.  

Pertinent portions of that conversation follow:

ATLB:  CoreTrace’s products are designed to protect computers and networks from viruses, spyware, malware and other harmful stuff. How does it do it and how does that compare to the conventional anti-virus software we regularly see?

Greg:  CoreTrace has a product called “Bouncer”. Bouncer works at the operating system level and allows only the programs or executable code that has been whitelisted by the system administrator through Bouncer to run on that computer. Typical antivirus software works by maintaining a huge database library of virus signatures (which you have to keep up to date) and it attempts to eliminate them by searching a computer’s hard drives, comparing the code it finds on the hard drives to the virus library and then if it finds a match, it eliminates the virus code. There are a few challenges with this type of a defense.
1. This is reactive in nature – By definition, a signature does not exist until someone gets infected.
2. Because it is reactive, antivirus is vulnerable to a ‘zero-day’ attack. This simply means that a ‘bad guy’ can create a new piece of malware and as long as the antivirus companies are not aware of his new virus/worm then they will be blind to it.
3. In order to be protected by antivirus, you must deploy the updated signatures as quickly as possible. This can lead to inadequate testing before pushing out the ‘change’. If the antivirus vendor has made a mistake in their signature update then you could be causing more harm.
a. See McAfee’s recent ‘false positive’ signature update fiasco


ATLB:  You used the term “whitelisting”. What does that mean?

Greg:   At the time it is first installed, Bouncer takes an inventory of the executable programs on the hard drives of the computer and approves each of them to run. It puts them on a “whitelist”, i.e. stuff that is allowed to run. It is called whitelist because the antivirus providers say the stuff in their libraries is on the “blacklist”.

ATLB:  So, if a virus or other malware is present on the machine when Bouncer is first installed, then it will be allowed to run?

Greg:  That’s true, unless it is specifically found and eliminated later. That’s the reason that a good antivirus software should be run before Bouncer is installed or it should be installed in new machines before they are attached to the internet or anywhere else that they could become infected. Should you discover that one of your systems was infected prior to deploying Bouncer, you can rest a little easier at least in the knowledge that the infection will not be able to spread (to any other Bouncer protected computers).

ATLB:  Doesn’t having to authorize every piece of code to run on a system require an inordinately large amount of administrator time?

Greg:  The program takes an inventory of all the programs running on the machine at the time of the installation and thereafter the administrator does not have to be involved. The administrator can ‘pre’-authorize all software from a specific company or with a specific signature and software installed later from that company or with that signature will automatically be whitelisted and allowed to run.

ATLB:  How much computer resources does the CoreTrace system utilize and how does this compare to antivirus software?

Greg:  Our software requires a very small amount of hard disk space for our program. Since it merely prevents unauthorized programs from running, it doesn’t regularly use many computer resources. Antivirus software needs to run on a regular basis to see if any identified malware has been added since the last scan. You may have noticed that when your antivirus software is running its scan, which may last an hour or two, your computer is devoting significant resources to the scan and can have an effect on the capabilities of the computer. Bouncer only needs to check the program as it is launched. This check against the whitelist is extremely fast and does not impact the load time for any whitelisted applications.

ATLB:  How often is your software updated?

Greg:  Except for enhancements and upgrades to the program for operational purposes, our software does not need to be regularly updated. Since our method of operation is to keep anything but authorized programs from executing, we don’t have to continually seek out new viruses and add them to our database. Because of this method, we can never be behind when a new virus comes out, because regardless of the sophistication or newness of the virus signature, it can be deposited on the computer’s hard drive but because it is not authorized, it simply can’t harm the computer or its contents. Compare that to antivirus databases that are required to be updated constantly on a real time basis and must necessarily contain millions of virus signatures and sometimes can only catch a virus after it has infected a number of machines, if the virus doesn’t match their database.

ATLB:  Is there a version for single workstations or computers?

Answer:  Not yet. Right now, our program is only deployed on an enterprise basis.
 

"First Do No Harm" - McAfee Runs Afoul Of This Rule

UPDATE:  In an effort to calm the waters, McAfee has offered to be responsible for "reimbursing reasonable expenses" for the cost of repairing the problems caused by the release of their glitch.  They are also proposing free extensions to existing, affected subscriptions.  This comes from a posting on their website and they promise to post details soon.  Whether this will calm the hordes with the torches and pitchforks at Mcafee's doors, only time will tell.

Original Post:

"Primum non nocere" [First do no harm] is attributed loosely to the Hippocratic Oath that doctors are taught.  Antivirus creators should have it embroidered on their pocket protectors.

Yesterday I was heavily into the creative process of preparing another post for this blog, which, ironically (or coincidentally, I can never determine), was to be about an antivirus protection method called "whitelisting".  Theoretically, if I had been using whitelisting, this post would not be pertinent. But that is the subject of the post that I never completed but which will appear at a later time.

Suddenly, upon having to reboot, my task bar disappeared, my computer couldn't recognize my wireless card and all sorts of other mischief ensued.  Constant rebooting and repetitive cursing did not help. OK, I surmised, my trusty old Dell Latitude, circa 2004, had finally given up the ghost after many years of hard use and diligent service.

However, news soon surfaced that this was an inside job.

 

I had relied on McAfee antivirus service for many years and had been generally satisfied.  However, yesterday, McAfee released an update that had a minor virus as its target but instead identified an essential file (svchost.exe) as malware.  In some computers, this file was quarantined.  In others (including mine), it was deleted.  This article does a great job of explaining the problem in greater detail.  Thousands of PCs were affected and many have not yet been returned to service.

My guy was able to reinstall the deleted file and my old Dell is back again.  Others have not been so lucky.

The public relations fall out of this will continue for some time.  Other vendors are already gleefully piling on.  Twitter storms have erupted and I received several tweets from CoreTrace, a whitelisting firm, emphasizing that this kind of thing wouldn't have happened on their watch.

So, what happens now.  You can bet that when problems arise, lawyers can't be far behind.  One can envision class actions suits and individual suits from large corporate clients that were affected.  The success of those suits will depend on the language in the individual corporate contracts and on the assessment of the courts in which the suits are filed.  McAfee's online contract, which applies to little people like me, excludes damages unless caused by "gross negligence".  The online contract also chooses New York law as the governing law.  New York law defines gross negligence as not just more negligence than simple negligence but an act of essentially a different nature, somewhat akin to intentional wrongdoing. Somers v. Federal Signal, 79 NY2d 540.  The determination of this by a court would take much expert testimony and analysis. 

Stay tuned.